Abstract-This paper studies an attacker against a cyberphysical system (CPS) whose goal is to move the state of a CPS to a target state while ensuring that his or her probability of being detected does not exceed a given bound. The attacker's probability of being detected is related to the non-negative bias induced by his or her attack on the CPS's detection statistic. We formulate a linear quadratic cost function that captures the attacker's control goal and establish constraints on the induced bias that reflect the attacker's detection-avoidance objectives. When the attacker is constrained to be detected at the false alarm rate of the detector, we show that the optimal attack strategy reduces to a linear feedback of the attacker's state estimate. In the case that the attacker's bias is upper bounded by a positive constant, we provide two algorithms-an optimal algorithm and a suboptimal, less computationally intensive algorithm-to find suitable attack sequences. Finally, we illustrate our attack strategies in numerical examples based on a remotely controlled helicopter under attack.
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I. INTRODUCTION

S
ECURITY vulnerabilities in cyber-physical systems (CPS), systems that interface sensing, communication, and control with an underlying physical process, allow for sophisticated cyber-attacks that cause catastrophic physical harm. In the past, events such as StuxNet [1] and the Maroochy sewage control incident [2] have demonstrated the vulnerability of industrial processes. More recently, cyber-physical attacks have targeted automobiles [3] , military vehicles [4] , and commercial drones [5] . These examples show that CPS remain susceptible to cyber-attacks, and, in response, there have been significant efforts to improve the security of CPS.
Part of the effort in improving cyber-physical security has been devoted to categorizing different types of attacks and developing security countermeasures for each type [1] , [6] . One particular type of attack is the integrity attack, in which an attacker manipulates the CPS's sensor readings and alters its The authors are with the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA 15217 USA (e-mail:, yuanche1@andrew.cmu.edu; soummyak@andrew.cmu.edu; moura@andrew. cmu.edu).
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TCNS. 2017.2690399 actuator control signals [6] , [7] . Prior work has analyzed CPS security sensor attacks, determining the fundamental limits of attack detection [8] and developing methods to reconstruct sensor attacks [9] - [11] . Existing work has also studied the capabilities of an integrity attacker, relating the ability of the attacker to perform undetectable attacks to certain geometric control-theoretic properties of the CPS [12] - [14] . For systems affected by process and sensor noise, Mo and Sinopoli [7] , [15] characterize the state estimation error caused by an attacker who tries to avoid detection. In addition to analyzing the ability of an integrity attacker to cause damage and evade detection, prior work has also studied how an attacker should behave in order to achieve his or her objectives. Zhang and Venkitasubramaniam [16] consider a noisy CPS and design an attack to optimally disrupt the system's feedback controller, while avoiding detection. Instead of attackers who seek to cause general disruption and damage to a CPS, our previous work studies attackers with specific control objectives [17] , [18] . In [18] , we considered an attacker whose goal is move the CPS to a target state while evading detection, formulated a cost function that penalized the deviation from the target state and the magnitude of the detection statistic, and we determined the optimal attack for such a cost function reduced to a linear feedback of the attacker's state estimate.
This paper studies an attacker who wishes to move the system to a target state, but, unlike [18] , we impose an explicit bound on the probability of an attack being detected. We model the CPS as a linear dynamical system subject to sensor and process noise equipped with a Kalman filter for state estimation and an LQG controller. The CPS uses a χ 2 detector as an attack detector, which reports an attack if the energy of the Kalman filter innovation exceeds a certain threshold [19] . This model has been used in the literature to model the CPS under attack (see, e.g., [20] , [21] ). The attacker's goal is to design a sequence of attacks that counters the system's linear quadratic gaussian (LQG) controller and minimizes the deviation of the CPS's state from the target state subject to a bound on the (non-negative) bias induced on the χ 2 detection statistic. We define a linear quadratic cost function that captures the attacker's control objective by penalizing the distance between the system's state and the target state. Then, we formulate the attack design problem as an optimization problem of finding a sequence of attacks that minimizes the cost function subject to an upper bound constraint on the bias induced in the detection statistic. This differs from our previous work [18] that studies unconstrained attack design where the attacker's detection 2325-5870 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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avoidance goals is an additional term of the overall cost function. This paper, unlike [18] , requires attacks at each time step to satisfy explicit constraints. Since we compute the optimal attack sequence in a causal manner, we must ensure that attacks at each time step are recursively feasible [22] to guarantee that it is possible to satisfy the constraints of future time steps. We use geometric control properties (similar to those studied in [23] ) of the CPS model to express, the constraint placed on the detection statistic bias as a linear constraint on the attack at each time step. From a practical perspective, this paper provides guarantees on the optimal attacks' probability of being detected (Chen et al. [18] do not provide such guarantees.) We consider separately two cases: 1) when the induced bias is constrained to be zero and 2) in which the induced bias is upper bounded by a positive constant. When the bias is zero, which restricts the attacker to be detected at the false alarm rate of the detector, we apply constrained dynamic programming to show that the optimal attack reduces to a linear feedback strategy. For bounded bias, we provide two algorithms to determine a suitable sequence of attacks. The first algorithm is more computationally intensive but finds an optimal sequence of attacks. The second, less computationally intensive, algorithm finds a (suboptimal) sequence of attacks that satisfies the detection constraint. A preliminary version of part of this paper appears in [24] , designing attacks constrained to be detected at the false alarm rate, but when the CPS are not equipped with LQG controllers. When the CPS is equipped with its own controller, which we consider here, the attacker must account for system input in designing his or her attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the model and assumptions for the CPS and attacker, reviews the χ 2 detector and the concept of recursive feasibility, and formally states the problems we address. In Section III, we determine the set of all recursively feasible attacks at each time step. In Section IV, we use dynamic programming to find an optimal strategy when the attacker's probability of being detected is constrained to be the detector's false alarm rate. Section V studies the case when the bias induced in the detection statistic is upper bounded by a positive constant; we provide two algorithms for computing attack sequences that achieve the attacker's objectives. We provide numerical examples of a remotely controlled helicopter under attack (from each of our proposed strategies) in Section VI, and we conclude in Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Notation
Let R denote the reals, R n denote the space of n-dimensional real (column) vectors, and R m ×n denote the space of real m × n matrices. The multivariate Gaussian distribution with mean μ and covariance Σ is denoted as N (μ, Σ). The n × n identity matrix is denoted as I n . For a matrix M , R(M ) denotes the range space of M , N (M ) denotes the null space of M , and M † denotes the Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse. For a symmetric matrix S = S T , S 0 denotes that S is positive semidefinite, and S 0 denotes that S is positive definite. For S 0, let · S denote the S-weighted 2-norm. That is, for S ∈ R n ×n and
B. System Model
We use the same, linearized 1 CPS model as follows [18] :
where x t ∈ R n describes the system's state, u t ∈ R m is the system input, e t ∈ R s is the attacker's input, 2 and w t and v t are the process and sensor noise, respectively. The sensor and process noise are independently, identically, distributed (i.i.d.) in time and mutually independent; w t has distribution N (0, Σ w ), and v t has distribution N (0, Σ v ), with Σ w , Σ v 0. The system starts running at time t = −∞, and the initial state of the system x −∞ has distribution N (0, Σ x ) with Σ x 0 and is independent of the noise processes. The pair (A, C) is observable, and the pair (A, B) is controllable. The matrices Γ and Ψ describe the attacker. The model (1) is commonly adopted in studies of CPS under attack [18] , [20] , [21] .
The system knows the matrices A, B, and C and the statistics of the noise processes and initial state, but does not know the matrices Γ and Ψ (since they describe the attacker). The system causally knows the system input u t and the sensor output y t , but not the attack e t . We assume the system's goal is to regulate the system state to the origin. Because the system cannot directly observe the state x t , it uses its sensor measurements y t to construct an estimate of the state using a Kalman filter. Then, the system performs feedback control on the state estimate to regulate the state to the origin. The system constructs its Kalman filter and controller assuming nominal operating conditions (i.e., e t = 0 for all t).
Under nominal operating conditions, the system's Kalman filter calculates x t , the minimum mean square error (MMSE) estimate of x t given all sensor measurements up to time t and input up to time t − 1. Since the system starts at t = −∞, the Kalman filter has fixed gain:
To regulate the state x t , the system has a feedback controller of the form
1 If the CPS is nonlinear, the model (1) represents its dynamics after linearization about an operating point. 2 The attack e t also models the case in which the attacker may separately attack the CPS's actuators and sensors. [19] uses the innovations sequence of the Kalman filter ν t defined as ν t = y t − C x t|t−1 , to determine whether or not an attack has occurred. The term x t|t−1 is the MMSE estimate of x t given all sensor measurements and system input up to time t − 1, assuming nominal operating conditions. When there is no attack (i.e., e t = 0 for all t), the innovations sequence is i.i.d. N (0, Σ ν ), where Σ ν = CPC T + Σ v , and ν t is orthogonal to x t|t−1 [25] . The χ 2 reports an attack if
where S is the window size of the detector, exceeds a threshold τ , which is chosenà priori to balance the false alarm and missed detection probabilities [19] . In this paper, we consider a χ 2 detector with window
There are attack detectors other than the χ 2 attack detector (see, e.g., [9] , [12] , [26] .) These detectors require noiselessness [9] , [12] , bounded energy noise [26] , or batch measurements [9] , [26] . This paper studies attacks against CPS under broader conditions on the noise and provides a recursive solution. We consider an online χ 2 detector for systems with process and sensor noise. The linear, state space model with a Kalman filter, feedback controller, and χ 2 attack detector with window size 1 is a standard model for a CPS subject to attack [18] , [20] , [21] .
C. Attacker Model
The attacker knows the system model and statistical properties, the controller feedback matrix L, and which sensors and actuators he or she can attack (i.e., the matrices Γ and Ψ). ] is injective. The attacker causally knows the sensor output y t and the attack e t . Additionally, the attacker causally knows y t = Cx t + v t , the value of the sensor output at time t before it is altered by the attack at time t.
The attacker performs Kalman filtering, separately from the system, to estimate the state. The attacker also uses his or her knowledge to compute the estimate produced by the system's Kalman filter. The attacker knows L and the system's state estimate, so he or she knows u t . We design attack strategies that depend on the attacker knowing the system's input. In general, so long as the attacker knows u t for all t, the CPS's control input need not be restricted to the form of (6) . For this paper, we only consider the case of feedback control, but our methodology may be tailored toward other control laws. The attack begins at time t = 0, i.e., for t = −∞, . . . , −1, e t = 0. During the time interval t = −∞, . . . , 0, the attacker observes the system output and keeps track of the state estimate x t .
The attacker's objective is to design an attack sequence over the finite time interval t = 0 to t = N that moves the system state to a target state x * while satisfying a detection-avoidance constraint. The attacker chooses the sequence
to accomplish his or her goals such that at time t, the attack e t only depends on the attacker's available information at time t, I t . Following [18] , I t is the classical information pattern [25] :
If a nonzero attack occurs, the attacker's Kalman filter then produces a different estimate than the system's Kalman filter and becomes:
The attacker's Kalman filter produces the MMSE state estimate given I t , i.e.,
The attack γ(0, t) induces a bias t in the system's innovation ν t . Under an attack γ(0, t), we have ν t = ν 0 t + t , where ν 0 t is the value of the system's innovation in the case that there had been no attack (i.e., e 0 = e 1 = · · · = e t = 0). The following state space dynamical system describes the relationship between γ(0, t) and t [18] :
where
ν -weighted 2-norm of t relates to the probability of the attack being detected at time t [27] . Let P D ,t = P (g t > τ) be the detection probability at time t. If t 2 Σ −1 ν = 0, then, for any positive detector window size, the probability of detection at time t is equal to the false alarm probability of the χ 2 detector, since there is no induced bias in ν t . For nonzero bias (and detector window size 1), the following lemma relates the bound on t 2 Σ −1 ν to the probability of being detected. Lemma 1 (Detection Probability Bound [27] 
where g 0 t is the value of the statistic g t when there is no attack. 4 To model the attacker's control objectives, define the cost function: with Q t 0. The cost function J penalizes deviation of the state from the target state. The attacker's goal is to design an attack γ(0, N) that achieves cost
the minimum cost of J subject to constraints on the Σ −1 ν -weighted 2-norm of t . The constraints in the optimization problem (11) model the attacker's goals of evading detection.
D. Recursive Feasibility
The attacker designs the attack in real time: At time t, the attacker chooses the attack e t based on his or her information I t . Note that the constraint t (11) is for all times t = 0, . . . , N. It is necessary that the attack be recursively feasible [22] : the attack e t must be chosen such that 
The recursive feasibility of (11) is related to the output minimization problem presented in [23] :
Lemma 2 ( [23] ): Consider the system in (9) with arbitrary initial state θ 0 . Then, for any k = 1, 2, . . . ,
where P k follows the solution to the Riccati equation
with P 0 = 0. Furthermore, the matrix P k is positive semidefinite, and min e 0 ,...,e k −1
E. Augmented State Space Notation
For the remainder of this paper, we use the augmented state space description of the CPS and attacker provided in [18] . Define the augmented state
where x 0 t denotes the system's state estimate in the case that e 0 = · · · = e t = 0. The state ξ t follows the dynamics (15) where ν t+1 denotes the attacker's innovation at time t + 1,
One important property of ξ t is that, given I t , the attacker can exactly determine the value of ξ t [18] . Accordingly, the attacker can use ξ t to determine his or her attack at time t.
Following [18] and [25] , we manipulate the cost function J by substituting x t = x t + n t , where n t is the estimation error. It is well known [25] that, given I t , n t is conditionally distributed as N 0, P , where
ν CP, and n t is conditionally orthogonal to x t . Performing this substitution, the optimal attack design problem becomes.
where N t=0 trace P Q t does not depend on γ(0, N).
F. Problem Statement
This paper addresses three main problems. Consider the optimal attack design problem (18) . First, determine, for any δ ≥ 0 and any time t = 0, . . . , N, the set of recursively feasible attacks. Second, find an optimal attack sequence γ(0, N) when δ = 0. This corresponds to finding the optimal attack under the constraint that the probability of being detected at any time t is equal to the false alarm probability of the detector. Third, find an optimal attack sequence γ(0, N) when δ > 0.
III. FEASIBILITY SETS
In this section, we determine which attacks e t are recursively feasible at time t. Recursively feasible attacks are attacks e t such that t 2 Σ −1 ν ≤ δ and there exists e t+1 , . . . , e N such that (15) and (16), we see that the recursively feasibility of an attack e t depends on the state ξ t . Define the sets Ξ t , t = 0, . . . , N as follows:
In 
The proof of Lemma 3 is found in the appendix. The set Ξ t is nonempty for all t = 0, . . . , N -if the θ t component of ξ t is equal to 0, then ξ t ∈ Ξ t . This is because, if θ t = 0, then, following system (9), the attack sequence γ(t, N ) = {0, . . . , 0} is one such that t
Recall that system (9) has initial state θ 0 = 0, so we have ξ 0 ∈ Ξ 0 . This means that the optimization problem (18) is feasible for any non-negative value of δ, i.e., the attacker can always satisfy the detection constraint by choosing not to attack the system.
IV. ATTACKS UNDER FALSE ALARM CONSTRAINTS
In this section, we find an attack sequence γ(0, N) that minimizes the cost function J under the constraint that t 2 Σ −1 ν = 0, corresponding to finding the optimal attack under the restriction that the probability of being detected is equal to the false alarm probability of the detector. For the case of δ = 0, we can relate the sets Ξ t to the output minimization problem presented in Lemma 2 and [23] . Define
The matrix G selects the variable θ t from ξ t (i.e., Gξ t = θ t ). 
and, for t = 0, . . . , N − 1,
The matrix Q t is given recursively backward in time by
with terminal condition Q N +1 = 0. Theorem 1 states that the optimal attack under the δ = 0 detection constraint is a linear feedback of the state ξ t , which is exactly determined by the attacker information I t . Equation (21) shows that the optimal attack e t depends on the matrix F t , which in turn depends on the matrix D t . If the matrix D t has full column rank, then, F t = 0, since, by definition, F t is the orthogonal projector onto N (D t ). If the matrix D t has full column rank for all t = 0, . . . , N − 1, then the optimal attack becomes γ(0, N) = {0, . . . , 0} . This corresponds to the case in which the attacker is not powerful enough, and his or her only option to satisfy the δ = 0 detection constraint is to not attack the system.
Before we prove Theorem 1, we provide intermediate results that show that the optimal attack exists and that the optimal attack sequence e 0 , . . . , e N −1 is unique (the attack e N may not be unique). The proofs are found in the appendix.
Lemma 5: For all t = 0, . . . , N, there exists U t 0 such that
One consequence of Lemma 6 is that Z t (ψ) is nonempty for all t = 0, . . . , N − 1 and for all ψ ∈ R 6n . Lemma 7: For any t = 0, . . . , N − 1 and for any ψ ∈ R 6n , if
Proof (Theorem 1): We resort to dynamic programming to solve (18) with δ = 0. The term N t=0 trace P Q t in (18) does not depend on γ(0, N). Define the optimal cost-to-go function for information I t as follows:
Equations (27) and (28) 
Combining (29) with the constraint N −1 = 0 and using the fact that GB = B, we have
where C N −1 and D N −1 are given by (23) . To solve (28), we eliminate the constraint in (30) (following [28] ) and consider attacks e N −1 of the form
After eliminating constraints and performing algebraic manipulations, (28) becomes
As a consequence of Lemma 6, such a z N −1 exists. One particular z N −1 that satisfies (33) is
There may be more than one z N −1 that satisfies (34). Manipulating (34), we have that z N −1 satisfies Substituting (34) into (32) and performing algebraic manipulations, we have
and
Repeating the dynamic programming procedure for t = N − 2, . . . , 0, we find that the optimal attack has the same form as (34), were we replace N − 1 with t.
V. ATTACKS UNDER GENERAL DETECTION CONSTRAINTS
In this section, we solve (18) (N, N ) less computationally-intensive procedure that finds a suboptimal and feasible attack sequence.
A. Optimal Attack With δ > 0
For this section only, we introduce the following notation: let E ξ t [·] denote the expectation taken over ξ t , and let E {ξ k } N t
[·] denote the expectation taken over ξ t , . . . , ξ N . Further, define the operator π t as π t (γ (t, N )) = e t . That is, π t is an operator that takes an attack sequence over N − t + 1 time steps and returns the first attack. To solve (18) with δ > 0, we consider, for t = 0, . . . , N − 1, the problem
where γ t (t, N ) = {e t , . . . , e N } is an attack sequence in which each attack e t , . . . , e N only depends on ξ t . 5 This differs from the definition of γ(t, N ), in which each attack e t , . . . , e N depends on ξ t , . . . , ξ N , respectively. Problem (38) has a convex objective and convex constraints, so it can be efficiently solved. Algorithm 1 works as follows. At time step t, for t = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, we find γ * t (t, N ), the sequence of attacks depending only on ξ t that solves problem (38). The attack e t is then set as the first attack in the sequence γ * t (t, N ). In the last ((N + 1) th) time step, the attack e N is set as the last attack component of the sequence γ * N −1 (N − 1, N) . By construction, every attack e t produced by Algorithm 1 is recursively feasible: after attacking the system with e t , the subsequence γ * t (t + 1, N) is a feasible attack sequence at time t + 1. In order to prove Theorem 2, we require the following Lemma from [25] : Lemma 8 ([25] ): Let g(ξ, u) be a function such that, for any ξ, min u ∈U g(ξ, u) exists and U is a class of functions for which
Proof (Theorem 2): From problem (18), we have that the optimal cost-to-go function at time t, J * t (ξ t ), is defined as
Let γ (0, N) = { e 0 , . . . , e N } denote the attack sequence produced by Algorithm 1. The attack sequence has the form show that γ (0, N) is an optimal attack sequence, we show that each attack e t = π t (γ * t (t, N )) is the optimal attack at time t, for t = 0, . . . , N − 1.
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In order to show that e t is the optimal attack, we prove the intermediate result that, for t = 0, . . . , N − 1,
We resort to induction. In the base case, we show that (42) is true for
.) Consider the right-hand side of (42) for t = N − 1. Expressed in terms of ξ N −1 , (42) becomes
Hξ N −1
Equation (43) follows from the right-hand side of (42) N − 1, N − 1) , which, by definition, is a function of ξ N −1 . Thus, the expectation over ξ N in (43) refers to the conditional expectation over ξ N given ξ N −1 .
In the induction step, we assume that (42) is true for t + 1 and show that it is true for t. The right-hand side of (42) for t becomes,
(47) 6 We ignore the attack e N because it does not affect the cost associated with γ (0, N ).
The expression in (46) follows from the right-hand side of (42) because γ t (t, N ) can be partitioned as {e t , γ t (t + 1, N)}, ξ t does not depend on γ t (t + 1, N), and a feasible γ t (t + 1, N) in (47) exists if and only if e t is recursively feasible.
Further manipulating (47), we have
where J t+1 (ξ t+1 ) is defined as
Equation (48) follows from (47) because the minimization in (47) is over γ t (t + 1, N) , which, by definition, is a function of ξ t , so the expectation over ξ t+1 , . . . , ξ N refers to the conditional expectation given ξ t . We also use Lemma 8 to exchange the minimization operation and expectation over ξ t+1 in (47) to derive (48). By the induction hypothesis, we have
. Substituting back into (48) and (46) shows that (42) is true for t.
To conclude the proof of Theorem 2, we note that, as a result of (42), for t = 0, . . . , N − 1,
Because e t is optimal for t = 0, . . . , t = N − 1 and e N does not affect the cost, γ (0, N) is an optimal attack sequence.
B. Windowed Attack Algorithm With δ > 0
Although Algorithm 1 gives the optimal attack sequence with δ > 0, it is also computationally expensive. In the first time step (t = 0), in order to find the optimal attack, Algorithm 1 aims to find an optimal N -length attack sequence subject to N constraints. In each subsequent time step, the length of the attack sequence over which the optimization occurs and the number of constraints in the optimization only decreases by 1. Even though (38) is a convex optimization, if N is large, then, in order to find the optimal attack, Algorithm 1 must repeatedly solve large (convex) optimization problems, each with a large number of constraints.
To find an attack sequence in a less computationally intensive manner, we consider the windowed attacker optimization problem: (N, N ) where W ∈ {2, . . . , N + 1} is a predetermined window size chosen by the attacker. 7 The goal of problem (51) is to find a W -length attack sequence that minimizes the attacker's cost over W time steps.
We use problem (51) to find a suboptimal attack sequence in less computationally intensive manner than Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 2 works as follows. At each time step t, for t = 0, . . . , N − W , we find a W -length attack sequence (that depends only on ξ t ) that minimizes the attacker's cost over W time steps. We set the attack e t to be the first component of the attack sequence γ t (t, t + W − 1). At each time step t, for t = N − W + 1, . . . , N, we determine the attack e t in the same way as in Algorithm 1.
The additional constraint P N −(t+W −1) Gξ t+W 2 Σ −1 ν ≤ δ ensures that the attack e t , as determined by Algorithm 2, is recursively feasible. The attack e t is the first component of a sequence γ t (t, t + W − 1) that satisfies all constraints in (51). The additional constraint requires that, for the state ξ t+W , which depends on γ t (t, t + W − 1), there exists an attack sequence γ t (t + W, N ) such that
. . , N, so the attack e t must be recursively feasible.
In each time step of Algorithm 2, we minimize cost over an attack sequence of length no greater than W , and subject to no more than W + 1 constraints. Thus, even if N is large, an attacker can use Algorithm 2 to find a feasible attack sequence without the computational expense of Algorithm 1 by choosing W to be small. One drawback of a small window size W is that the resulting attack sequence incurs a larger cost J. We verify the tradeoff between window size and optimality gap via numerical simulation in Section VI.
VI. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
We demonstrate the proposed attack strategies under detection constraints with separate examples for the δ = 0 and δ > 0 cases. We consider the linearized state space model which means that the attacker only cares about manipulating the x (2) and x (6) components of the helicopter's state, corresponding to vertical and lateral velocity, respectively. The system starts running at t = −75, and the attacker attacks the system from t = 0 to t = 75 (i.e., N = 75). First, we consider an attacker, denoted as "A1," that can attack all of the actuators and eight of the sensors-the attacker cannot alter the sensors measuring x (8) (yaw rate) and x (9) (roll angle). Fig. 1 shows the effect of the optimal attack (A1) with the δ = 0 constraint, and Fig. 2 provides a componentwise description of the optimal attack over time. From time t = 0 to t = 75, the attack computed using Theorem 1 moves the system to the target state while satisfying the t 2 Σ −1 ν = 0 constraint. Second, we consider an attacker, denoted as "A2," that can attack inputs u (3) and u (4) and manipulate the sensor values measuring x (2) , x (6) , x (7) , and x (10) . Fig. 3 shows that, for the attacker (A2), the optimal attack with δ = 0 constraint does not successfully move the system to the target state. This is because the attacker is not powerful enough and cannot attack enough sensors and actuators. Indeed, as Fig. 4 shows, the optimal strategy for (A2) under the δ = 0 constraint is to not attack the system. For demonstrating the attack strategies with δ > 0, we consider the attacker (A2). In the implementation of Algorithms 1 and 2, we solve the optimization problems (38) and (51) using MOSEK [30] . First, we consider the optimal attack from Algorithm 1 under the constraint δ = 1. Fig. 5 shows that, by following Algorithm 1, the attacker (A2) is able to move the system to the target state while satisfying the t 2 Σ −1 ν ≤ 1 constraint. Fig. 6 provides a componentwise description of the optimal attack under the inequality constraint.
We then consider the attacker (A2) using the windowed attack algorithm (see Algorithm 2) with window size W = 5. Fig. 7 shows that, such as the optimal attack, the suboptimal attack computed using Algorithm 2 also successfully brings the system state to the target state while satisfying the t Fig. 8 shows that the windowed attack resembles the optimal inequality constrained attack. Both the optimal and windowed attack satisfy the t with inequality, which shows that the optimal cost is achieved at the boundary of the constraint set. The optimal attack strategy induces as large a bias t as allowed by the explicit detection avoidance constraints.
The performance of Algorithm 2 depends on the window size W . We evaluate the cost attained by Algorithm 2 [by attacker (A2)] as a function of the window size W and the value of the constraint bound δ. For each W and each value of δ, we compute the optimality gap of Algorithm 2 as the average cost of 10 000 simulations. The optimal cost is the one obtained by Algorithm 1, which we compute as the average of 10 000 simulations.
In general, for a fixed target state x * , the optimality gap between the optimal attack and windowed attack depends on the window size W and the bound δ. Fig. 9 shows that, as window size W increases, the cost achieved by Algorithm 2 approaches the optimal cost. For the smallest window size W = 2, which corresponds to the greedy attack strategy of minimizing the onestep-ahead cost under recursive feasibility constraints, tighter detection avoidance constraints (i.e., lower values of δ) incur a noticeably larger optimality gap. One possible explanation is that, for tighter constraints, there is a limited set of feasible attacks at any time step, and the greedy strategy further limits the set of feasible attacks at future time steps, resulting in a larger overall optimality gap. That is, the impact of the greedy strategy on the optimality gap is greater for tighter constraints.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied attackers with control objectives and detection constraints against CPS. We formulated a cost function that captures the attacker's control objectives and defined constraints that relate to the probability of the attack being detected. In the case that the attacker's probability of being detected is constrained to be the false alarm rate of the detector, we showed that the optimal attack strategy is a linear feedback of an augmented system state calculated from the attacker's information set. Under more general constraints to the attacker's effect on the CPS's detection statistic, we provided an algorithm to find the optimal attack sequence and a second, less computationally intensive, algorithm to find a feasible, suboptimal attack. Finally, we illustrated our attack strategies through numerical examples involving a remotely controlled helicopter under attack.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 3:
Proof: We resort to induction. The base case of t = N is true by the definition of Ξ N . In the induction step, we assume that there exists a sequence of attacks γ(t + 1, N) such that = N ( P 1 G) .
In the induction step, we assume that Ξ t+1 = N ( P N −t G), and we show that In the induction step, we assume that Q t+1 = H T Q t+1 H + U t+1 for some U t+1 0, and we show that there exists U t 0 such that Q t = H T Q t H + U t . From the induction hypothesis, we have that Q t+1 0 since Q t+1 0 and U t+1 0. Then, by algebraic manipulation of (25), we have
